Part one of a series

I posted five days ago about “drying up the insurgents’ lake” in Iraq, that is, turning the populations in which the terrorists live and operate away from support to neutrality, then away from neutrality to opposition. I remarked that Islamism has not proved to be a rallying beacon for any but the fanatical, and al Qaeda’s murderousness in Iraq, coupled with their political ineptitude, has set them at a marked disadvantage in fighting America there or, since Jan. 30’s elections, the new Iraqi government.

There is, however, more than one insurgency operating in Iraq, and the success of Iraq im gaining a stable, democratic country depends on how each are finally defeated. This series is a look at the main groups operating, starting with Baathist holdouts, Saddam loyalists and others of that ilk who fall under the general rubric of “Former Regime Elements” (FRE’s).

These are Saddam loyalists or Baathists party adherents who want Baathism returned to rule in Iraq, even though they know it will not be under Saddam again. FREs are anti-democracy and wish for the status quo antebellum in Iraq to be mostly restored. They are almost all Sunnis who do not want to live in a country where the Shia majority has a say in how things are run. Many (perhaps most) are related by blood or marriage to Saddam’s own Tikriti clan. Those kids of ties are very strong in Arab culture.

FREs are secular in orientation and by no means want to live under an Islamist government, either. This is the largest organized insurgency in Iraq and the first insurgency to “get its act together” to fight the Americans because Saddam’s regime actually planned for this eventuality. For many months after the invasion, FREs constituted the most dangerous threat to both American forces and Iraq’s future. Their strategy was not to defeat American forces in straight-up battle (impossible for them to do) but to commit terrorist acts that would finally convince America that the cost of staying would be too great to bear. (That Americans are inherently unwilling to take more than minimal casualties is a delusion FREs shared with al Qaeda.)

Recently, though, some FREs did attempt to engage Iraqi and American units in conventional battle; FREs mounted an attack against Americans at Abu Ghraib prison early this month, for example. As Strategy Page explains,

Some officers who specialized in studying the Iraqi Army believe the attack reflected pre-war Iraqi doctrine and staff work. To some students of insurgency believe this suggests that the anti-government forces have been able to establish base camps or “liberated zones,” where they can spend time and resources training troops. If this is true, then the war may have entered a more ominous phase. Other analysts, however, believe that attack may have been a desperate attempt to use the best available insurgent manpower; Iraqi Army and Republican Guard personnel, to secure a spectacular success. If this is the case, then the Sunni Arabs suffered a serious defeat and the loss of critical manpower that ought to have been used to provide cadres to help turn volunteers into more effective fighters.

There were between 40-60 terrorists known killed and their total casualty rate was probably 50 percent.

The FRE insurgency is the most numerous and receives substantial support from Syria, also ruled by Baathism. The long-term threat from FREs is not insignificant, but despite its size and financial assets, FRE’s pose the least long-term threat because they are more adaptable to changing conditions than al Qaeda. By that I means that the FREs can recognize defeat and do not seek to die rather than lose. In fact, there were credible reports months ago that a large number of FRE fighters are exploring whether the Iraqi government will give them some sort of amnesty in exchange for laying down their arms.

For these reasons I say that the FRE insurgency, while still potent, is the least long-term threat to Iraq’s success - unless . . . well, keep reading.

Coming - a look at al Qaeda in Iraq and the criminal insurgency