One Hand Clapping
RSS/XML | Add to My Yahoo!| Essays | Disclaimer | Main Page | My Bio | | Archives | Backup Site

Saturday, November 15, 2003


More on al Qaeda's strategy, or its lack
Back on Sept. 15, I wrote an essay called, " Osama bin Laden’s strategic plan - well folks, he ain’t got one, which Glenn Reynolds kindly linked to on Nov. 11.

My basic thesis is this: Osama bin Laden has a strategic goal but no strategic plan. That is, he has a simple idea of what end states he wants to achieve. He has described them in writing and in interviews many times going back many years.

Basically, he wants:

  • All Americans, both military and civilians, out of Saudi Arabia, the land of Mecca and Medina, then out of all Arab lands. This goal is clearly number one, he has said so.

  • The House of Saud to be stripped of power and the country ruled according to sharia, pure Islamic law. In other words, Saudi Arabia is to become a Taliban-like country.

    (I discussed the instability of the House of Saud and its vulnerability here and here .)

  • Islamic law to be established in all the other Gulf states.

  • The Islamic caliphate to be re-established, meaning one unified religious-political ruler over the Muslim lands.

    Ultimately, of course, bin Laden wants the entire world converted to Islam, but so does practically every other Muslim. This goal is not one that he is working toward now; it must wait until the others are achieved.

    But, I concluded, bin Laden does not have a real strategic plan to achieve these goals.
    I see no evidence that bin Laden has ever had any plan except violence itself, committing it where he could, when he could. He commits violence against Western targets with no vision apparent beyond the violence. He has no idea of how to constitute a true nation state. He is a man whose vision extends no further than more fighting, which is to say, he has no vision at all.
    As I also explained in the post, bin Laden has said he believes that America has no will to slug it out with him. He said that it would be easier to defeat America than the Afghan Mujahedin defeated the Soviets. Hence, his increasing level of violence against America springs from that belief: eventually we will cave in rather than take greater numbers of dead.

    Thus, there is no campaign plan as Western strategists understand the concept. A campaign plan is a plan for a connected, inter-relational series of blows against the enemy designed to compel him to do what you want him to do. Campaigns consist of a series of battles that culminate in achieving one or more strategic objectives.

    Two things that the classic military theorist Carl von Clausewitz pointed out are worth considering when contemplating al Qaeda’s operations. First, the whole point of military operations is simply to "compel the enemy to fulfil our will." Second, one must always remember that the enemy both acts and reacts. Hence, plans and operations must be adjusted accordingly.

    Retired Army Lt. Col. Greg Wilcox wrote in, "Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative," that
    Current U.S. military doctrine addresses the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, but it emphasizes the strategic level. It is a top-down formalistic approach to war; whereas, the Al Qaeda approach is informal, bottom-up, evolutionary, and constantly adapting to changing conditions. ... it can easily shift from assassinations to weapons of mass destruction to hit and run raids to car bombs.
    I disagree. Al Qaeda’s operational approach shows no evidence of being either evolutionary or adaptive. Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders seem never to have imagined doing anything other than committing terrorist attacks, the bloodier the better, believing that such attacks would by themselves compel us to abandon the Gulf.

    What Lt. Col. Wilcox does not address is just how various assassinations, hit and run raids and car bombs (he erroneously ascribes WMDS to al Qaeda’s arsenal) constitute a strategy in either a Western or Eastern understanding. To be fair, the point of his paper lies elsewhere, but my point is this: al Qaeda’s intermittent acts of violence have relatively little actual effect, except propagandistic or psychological, which Wilcox does address:
    We have to convince several audiences of [our] moral correctness [in ousting Saddam] and make them empathetic to our success. That fight is being waged right now in Iraq in a race against time to see who can convince the Iraqis of the rightness of our actions to liberate all Iraqis from tyranny.
    While I certainly agree that we must devote significantly more attention to "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqis, as I wrote here, al Qaeda and the dead enders fighting us in Iraq are not trying to win hearts and minds, but convince the Iraqi people that America is either unable to prevail and will eventually quit trying to do so. Enemy fighters and leaders are dictatorial, not consensual, rulers. They do not seek to persuade the Iraqi people that their cause is right and just. They simply want the Iraqis to think that we cannot or will not win and al Qaeda will.

    Terror outside Iraq

    Countless words have been written by columnists and pundits about how al Qaeda selected its targets, but bin Laden’s selection criteria have been quite simple:

  • Targets must be able to be attacked without significant security risks.
  • Bin Laden has said that America is the "main enemy," so targets that are clearly American are best (but as the Nov. 15 bombing in Turkey shows , not required).
  • Third, the more deaths caused, the better.

    Hence, the attacks on USS Cole, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 9/11 attacks all fit. All three were clearly American targets. USS Cole suffered "only" 17 dead, but was spectacularly easy for al Qaeda to conduct. The 9/11 attacks had a relatively higher level of security risks for al Qaeda, but the payoff, in their minds, of thousands dead was worth the risk.

    But a target list does not a strategy make, especially when fighting an enemy that is adaptive and tenacious as an aroused America. As the invaluable Victor Davis Hanson pointed out,
    Americans once feared to retaliate against random bombings; terrorists now wonder when we will stop - as the logic of September 11 methodically advances to its ultimate conclusion. Aroused democracies reply murderously to enemy assaults in a manner absolutely inconceivable to their naïve attackers.
    Yet, as the attacks in Riyadh last week and today in Turkey show, the only "strategy" that al Qaeda has to counter our response is more of the same.

    So, if we haven’t fled the Saudi Arabia and the other Muslim countries yet, it can only be because too few of us have been killed. Maybe another 100,000 of our dead will do the trick:
    In regard to rumors about a large-scale attack against the U.S. during the month of Ramadan, [top al Qaeda commander Abu Salma] Al-Hijazi said that "a huge and very courageous strike" will take place and that the number of infidels expected to be killed in this attack, according to primary estimates, exceeds 100,000. He added that he "anticipates, but will not swear, that the attack will happen during Ramadan."

    He further stated that the attack will be carried out in a way that will "amaze the world and turn Al Qaida into [an organization that] horrifies the world until the law of Allah is implemented, actually implemented, and not just in words, on His land... You wait and see that the balance of power between Al Qaida and its rivals will change, all of a sudden, Allah willing."
    I give this threat practically no credibility. Not only is such exaggeration and boasting a cultural trait of Arab men, al Qaeda has almost certainly been far too badly hurt to carry out such an attack. As I pointed out in another September essay,
    The US is making progress against them on too many fronts - military, economic, ideological, logistical, political - for al Qaeda to count on the stability needed to plan for long-ranger operations. Bases, personnel, resources and government support needed to conduct effective attacks against high-value targets just can't be forecast very far ahead. They face a much higher uncertainty about who might have been "turned" by the US to work against them.

    They have lost too much major talent either to death or capture. Their first team is pretty much off the field and the benchers trying to carry on aren't up to the job. They don't have the personal renown of the terrorists who have been killed or captured, and among the societies they most need assistance from, personal reputation is extremely important. But they are virtual unknowns for the most part.

    Al Qaeda is still dangerous, but the danger of a spectacular attack by them is much lower than ever.
    I stand by that. What Al-Hijazi’s threat shows is that (a) al Qaeda itself has not given up and will continue to attack when and where it can and (b) its high command has no other ideas. But that is not a strategy. And it will not work.

    Is true strategy heretical?

    Steven Den Beste posted a response to my September essay on Osama bin Laden’s lack of strategy. Steven says that bin Laden does have a strategic plan, once you get inside his religious world view.
    I would have thought that a man of God like Donald would have spotted it: bin Laden's strategy was to get God, or Allah, involved in the war against the infidel.

    But it's perhaps not so strange that Donald didn't see it; he's a man of God, but he was a career military officer before becoming a minister, and he's a rationalist and a son of the Christian Enlightenment. Our enemy's thinking is just as foreign for Donald as it is for me as an Atheist. ...

    All of the suicide attacks over the last thirty years are viewed that way, to a greater or lesser extent. When they're referred to as "martyrs", that's not entirely propaganda and rhetoric. Those who sacrifice themselves to kill Islam's enemies are seen by the zealots as performing acts of faith, acts of devotion, acts of genuine worship. In doing so they atone for their own sins, and for the sins and moral corruption of their people. The goal is not so much to directly defeat their enemies through these attacks as it is to show their worthiness to once again be given God's direct help in the Crusade. And so it is that while some sacrifice themselves in attacks against the Jews and Americans, others pray to God to destroy those same Jews and Americans. That is how they expect to win. ...

    And that's why al Qaeda's plans seem idiotic to rationalists like Donald and me. bin Laden could not create and follow the kind of plan which we'd think was essential. If bin Laden's plan had been based entirely on temporal power and cogent strategy and real resources, and if such a plan did not rely on miracles, it would have demonstrated lack of faith. If there were no place in the plan for God, it would prove that bin Laden didn't truly believe God would help.

    And it would therefore prove that bin Laden didn't deserve any help from God, because it would prove that his faith wasn't really pure. For bin Laden to create such a plan would be a heretical act. ...

    The only way to truly prove your faith is to rely on miracles, and that's what I think they're doing. I think that was bin Laden's strategy. [emphases original]
    Well, a couple of responses. I wrote about the religious world view of al Qaeda in my Sept. 2001 essay, Why We Were Attacked: Religious Motivations for Anti-Western Violence, so it isn’t a topic of which I am unaware.
    We westerners may really believe that the campaign is simply military or political or even judicial, but in Islam, all of these arenas are subordinated to religious doctrine; indeed they really are part of the warp and woof of Islam itself. Islam does not distinguish, even in theory, between religion and state as the West does. They have no "handle" on which to hang the claim that there is no religious component of western response to the terrorist acts of Sept. 11. ...

    The primary motivation of the Taliban, bin Laden and Al Qaeda springs from their extreme religious fundamentalism. This has been pointed out by numerous Arab/Muslim commentators for years. They see western culture as such an extreme threat that they are willing to commit suicide to turn it back.

    I am not speaking of what we think of when we talk about "western culture." We cite things like trashy movies, vacuous television, fascination with celebrity, addiction to leisure and entertainment, materialism, consumerism, political corruption, and other various ills of our society. While such things are religiously repulsive to Al Qaeda's strain of Islamic fundamentalism, they are not their chief objection.

    The threat that the West (the USA being the foremost western nation) presents to the Taliban and their religious ilk is the West's world view, scientific epistemology. They perceive our scientific-technological world view as an overwhelming threat not merely to their way of life, but as an actual affront to Allah, and indeed, reality itself.

    Their world view is, briefly and simplistically this: there is no new knowledge about Reality to be discovered after the life of Mohammed and outside the text of the Koran. (1) In this view, the universe is a closed book. ...

    Islamists see scientific epistemology not only as heretical, but something that actually threatens reality itself. In their mind, they are literally saving the world when they fly airliners into skyscrapers. ...

    Thus, this struggle is not principally a clash between political systems. It is a clash of incompatible world views and irreconcilable ways of understanding the nature of reality itself. ...

    There is no concession that the United States can offer to pacify them. There is no foreign policy change we can make that will satisfy them. Those things are not the things that have caused them to raise the sword. It is quite literally impossible for the West to placate them, because we cannot culturally internalize their fundamental way of understanding reality.
    Second, Steven does have a good point: once Allah decides to intervene, then Islamist success will pretty much automatically follow. The question is how to persuade Allah to jump in.

    Islamists of the al Qaeda stripe are convinced of two main things:

  • Only they are the keepers of true Islamic faith.
  • The Arab people yearn for pure Islamic society and the implementation of sharia law. Thus, al Qaeda sees the Arab ummah as their natural allies, not foes.

    So they do not envision Allah’s intervention quite as spectacularly as Steven describes. It is not the very hand of God that will descend to sweep away the infidels. They believe that the weakness of American will, the continuing success of terrorist attacks, and the chafing of the ordinary people for true Islamism will combine to achieve the goals I described above.

    Osama bin Laden has said that his goal is not to conquer Saudi Arabia in a conventional sense, but to expose the corruption and weakness of the House of Saud so that the Saudi people will rise up in righteous revolution. When this is done, it will be proof that Allah has intervened. Allah in Islam, just as God in Judaism and Christianity, is seen to work his will through the events of historical processes. Miracles (more properly, stories of miracles), as Steven seems to describe them, serve to reinforce the believers’ faith and sense of community with others of the faith. They are not relied on as an operational plan either for war or business or other endeavors.

    So the Islamists’ reliance on miraculous, divine intervention is not quite the way Steven describes. The point of their faithfulness to Islam is not to lead to supernatural displays of divine power, but to put them on the right side of history, to borrow a Marxist term. They understand that one way or another, the dar al Islam will ultimately triumph over the dar al harb: Islam will reign supreme over infidels. They seek, first, to be true Muslims and second, to help history move toward that triumph.

    Their willingness to wage jihad against the infidels, especially giving their lives to do so, is how they cement their place as keepers and defenders of the faith. This faithfulness is not intended to make Allah suddenly, personally strike his enemies dead, but to make Islamist victory inevitable. Why? Because when they order their lives according to Islamic dicta (as they propound it), the flow of human affairs will naturally lead to Islamic triumph. That’s the way Allah has ordered the world.

    But this belief is dependent upon a few things, not least of which is that Islam is actually the one true faith in all the world. It depends on their presuppositions that America is weak and weak willed. It depends on the Muslim ummah really wanting to see Islamism established across all the Arab lands, and that the ummah are willing to revolt to make it so.

    All these things are highly problematic. However concrete al Qaeda’s ultimate goals may appear, achieving them rests on a serious sense of self delusion and premises that are far from certain.

    Update: Let me not forget to point out that the Clinton administration - Janet Reno, no less - certified that bin Laden and Saddam were cooperating on weapons programs. And The Weekly Standard has more documentation.

    by Donald Sensing, 11/15/2003 10:58:01 PM. Permalink |  





  • Feedburner RSS/XML readers online:


    Home