Why does al Qaeda fight Americans in Iraq?
Despite the fact that Saddam's government was basically secular and Saddam only half-heartedly attempted to present himself as a Muslim faithful, the evidence is incontroverible that al Qaeda would rather have seen Saddam's military defeat the Americans than be defeated, even if that meant the survival of Saddam's un-Islamic regime.

Al Qaeda's primary goal, as explicated by Osama bin Laden many times, is first to expel the Americans from Arab lands, most especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, of which Iraq is one.

Second, bin Laden has said many times that he wants the Muslim countries to be governed strictly only by sharia law, or Islamic religious code. American attempts to inculcate democracy in Iraq are much more harmful for that goal than the continuation of Baathist Iraq would have been. As Ralph peters points out,

No major Arab state wants to see a functioning democracy emerge in Iraq. They don't want a free Iraqi media or decent human-rights practices to set an example for the oppressed in their own countries.

Even a marginally successful democracy in Iraq would undermine the decrepit, villainous regimes, from Riyadh to Damascus to Cairo, which have done so much to retard Arab development.

And would undermine bin Laden’s plans just as strongly, probably more. Hence, as long ago as February 11, bin Laden called upon Iraqis to fight the Americans, even by suicide attacks if necessary. Was he trying to save Saddam’s skin or his Baathist government? Not at all. In fact, in his Feb. 11 statement broadcast on al Jazeera TV, bin Laden admitted he was forced to make a pact with the devil (as Churchill termed his alliance with the USSR),

Socialists are infidels wherever they are. . . [but] it does not hurt that in current circumstances, the interests of Muslims coincide with the interests of the socialists in the war against crusaders.

"Crusaders" is bin Laden’s usual term for Americans. Hence, al Qaeda’s professional cadre tried to act proactively to forestall Saddam’s defeat. For example, former Egyptian special forces officer Saif al-Adel, one of the FBI’s "Most Wanted" terrorists (wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya) is a high-ranking member involved in al Qaeda’s military operations. His affiliation with al Qaeda is through the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was run by al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al-Adel wrote extensively last March about al Qaeda’s lessons learned in fighting American forces in Afghanistan. The intended audience was those fighting allied forces in Iraq, whether the fighters were Iraqi military or al Qaeda cadre or their affiliates. Intel Center summarizes,

Al-Adel’s background fits with the subject matter of these two recent pieces, which are studies regarding the lessons learned from US operations in Afghanistan and the tactics, techniques and procedures al-Qaeda utilized to counter them. The focus of this report is on the first and most significant of the two articles written by al-Adel. The article is entitled, “Message to Our People in Iraq and the Gulf [Region] Specifically, and to our Islamic Ummah in General: The Islamic Resistance Against the American Invasion of Qandahar and Lessons Learned.” As the title of the article states, the intended audience for this training material are the fighters operating in Iraq against the US and its coalition allies. . . .

In this article, al-Adel passes down a portion of the knowledge al-Qaeda has compiled on what worked and did not work in Afghanistan so that those fighting in Iraq against the US will meet with success. He writes, “This message, which was prepared in a hurry, aims at providing our people in the Arab region with a clear picture, from the [battle] field, of the reality of the American enemy and its fighting tactics. . . .

Intel Center continues,

Even a strong show of support by the Iraqi people for the US, as well as actions by the US to put power into the hands of a new Iraqi government will not be enough to change al-Qaeda’s desire to support terrorist and guerrilla actions in Iraq. For al-Qaeda, the coalition presence on the soil of an Arab and Muslim land is enough to justify the need to respond. As Osama bin Laden has already stated, the protection of the Saddam Hussein regime or any other ruling party for that matter are not the focus of their involvement.

It’s true that Osama bin Laden has no love for Saddam personally nor for Baathism generally. But bin Laden’s goal in Iraq is not to save Saddam, it is to kill Americans so that they will leave. If al Qaeda can fight the Americans there while gaining an ever-stronger presence in Iraq, they believe they will be in a position to establish a pure Islamic state in Iraq when the Americans leave. Whether Saddam is presently alive or dead does not matter to al Qaeda. They are not fighting for him to retake the reins of government there, but so that they can do so.

But they have run smack into the flypaper strategy, which is working quite well. See also Austin Bay’s excellent summary thereof.

by Donald Sensing, 9/17/2003 02:27:41 PM. Permalink |