Inside the Battle of Baghdad - guest blog by Ranger officer Patrick Walsh (ret.)
A lot of people are worried about U.S. troops getting bogged down in urban combat in Baghdad or other large cities in Iraq. Their knowledge of urban combat, also known as Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), comes from repeated references to Stalingrad or other WWII battles by the talking heads on TV or memories of the U.S. operations in Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) or the terrifying final scenes in the movie Saving Private Ryan.

Actually, the Battle of Baghdad is likely to be more like the Battle of Panama, where only a few poorly defended buildings had to be captured by force, than like Stalingrad where two million men fought for six months.

In the case of Stalingrad, Mogadishu or the fictional battle in Saving Private Ryan, technological or political conditions combined with the characteristics of urban terrain to force combatants to rely almost entirely on infantry weapons. If the opposing forces were equally determined to win, the result was often an endless series of small battles for the next room or hallway. There might be a hundred small, deadly fights for every single city block. Yet there were other battles, such as the American attack in Aachen or Manila in WWII or in Panama in 1989 that demonstrated how proper tactics and equipment can overcome the challenges of urban warfare to produce victories at relatively low casualty rates, even when the attackers are outnumbered.

Remember that the final scenes in Saving Private Ryan, as intense as they are, cover about 20 minutes and involve less than a dozen Americans. There are no guarantees in warfare and there can always be some terrible accident or the enemy can get a lucky hit. But, there is very little chance of some sort reenactment of Stalingrad.

Here are some of the reasons why urban warfare has been so costly in the past and an explanation of how those conditions are different today.

1. Both combatants were very determined to win. If one or both sides give up quickly there are usually much fewer casualties. In Stalingrad, for example, Russian troops were very motivated to defend their homeland. This feeling was reinforced by summary execution of commanders and soldiers who lost ground. On the other side of the battle, German soldiers kept on fighting until they literally dropped dead from exhaustion and starvation. This level of motivation is relatively rare. In the pending war, the Iraqi Army is very likely to surrender or desert en masse as soon as the first bombs and missiles hit. There were massive surrenders and desertions 1991. This time they know how the movie ends and are even less likely to stay and fight. I think that includes the Republican Guard. One troop of U.S. Cavalry destroyed a brigade of the Republican Guard in something like 20 minutes in 1991. As I said, they know how the movie ends.

2. Huge forces were involved on both sides. In WWII hundreds of thousands of soldiers were involved on either side of major battles. With such large forces, the defenders could establish an unbroken defensive front, miles in length, and the attackers were left with no choice but to attack through it, head on. Not only were the defensive positions tens or even hundreds of miles wide they were often ten or more miles in depth. To give you some idea of the scale of fighting, the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad had about 300,000 men when a Russian force of nearly 1,000,000 encircled it. The combined total of both the Iraqi and American forces in any war is likely to be between 400,00 - 600,000 and these forces will be spread out over a country the size of California. In the Mogadishu fight the numbers were much smaller but the enemy outnumbered the Americans as much as 20 to 1 and surrounded them. In order for the Rangers to go anywhere they had to fight through the enemy. But even in this case the smaller numbers meant the fight was short lived (around 48 hours) unlike the months involved in a major battle.

3. The third difference is the technology available to the combatants. In WWII the technology of the Russians, Germans, Japanese and Americans was roughly equivalent. The nature of urban terrain tended to negate any technological advantages that did exist and force all combatants to rely primarily on hand held weapons. That is not the case with the Iraqi’s and Americans.

Until very recently, aircraft had a lot of trouble hitting specific targets. Even when they managed to hit them, the bombs did not have the effect that modern ones do. Modern aircraft can effectively strike pinpoint ground targets today under conditions in which WWII airplanes could not even fly. As a result, WWII aircraft were not as effective at destroying the defensive positions in a city. And for a large part of the time they could not participate in the battles at all because of darkness or weather. In contrast, modern U.S. aircraft are deadly accurate at night and consider nighttime the best time for air attacks because the can see so well while the enemy is comparatively blind. And Americans will have air superiority to a greater degree than enjoyed by any side during WWII. In the coming fight airpower will be closely coordinated with the ground fight. In at least some cases the front line commander will be able to call in aircraft to hit specific buildings to his immediate front. This occurred even as far back as Panama when ground commanders were able to direct Apache helicopters to fire Hellfire Missiles at enemy snipers in positions that could not be attacked with infantry weapons.

Armored fighting vehicles did not make up as high a proportion of the forces involved in previous wars and they were not as effective as today's, either. To give one example, the Germans had about 675 Tanks assigned to the Battle of Stalingrad as part of a force of more than a million men. Today, a single U.S. Army Mechanized Division, depending on task-organization, will have around 432 armored fighting vehicles (tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles) as part of a 17,000-man force. Even when they were available, WWII tanks were hard to keep running. They broke down. They threw tracks. They had trouble going over or through rubble. They were relatively vulnerable to artillery fire, Molotov Cocktails, mines and shouldered fired anti-armor weapons. They could be stopped much more easily than modern vehicles. There are very few weapons on earth that can “kill” an M1 Abrams tank. While a Bradley is more vulnerable it is still very survivable. Both are reliable and mobile.

Another aspect of this is the degree is the degree of motorization (or lack of motorization) of the supporting arms and services in past battles. In the battle for Stalingrad, much of the German Army’s artillery and supplies were moved by horses and the lack of roads in Russia meant the German’s had great difficulty supplying their attacking force. That will not be a problem for the attacking Americans.

Finally, no one had satellite photography and aerial photography had to be developed using chemicals back at the airfield and copies of photos had to be made one or two at a time. Photos seldom got to the front lines in time to be useful. Today, satellite photos or video from UAV’s can be transmitted to front line commanders in near real time.

How do all these factors affect attacking a large city in Iraq?

We think a large part of the Iraqi Army will surrender or desert, but we can’t plan on that. Some significant number of Iraqis may defend a significant portion of Baghdad. We will be able to see them using satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s), aircraft and in-person reports from Special Forces and friendly Iraqis. They will not be able to see us until we are firing on them. Even then, they may not see us because we can fire at them at night using night vision capabilities that they cannot match. . The Iraqis have few weapons that can destroy our tanks and not many more that can destroy Bradley. Our tanks can destroy anything they have. Our tank and Bradley crews can fire faster, more accurately and from a longer distance (not as key in a city, but still important) than their guys. Our infantry is also better trained, better equipped and better motivated.

The basic scenario will be for helicopters and airplanes to drop precision bombs and missiles on the defenders before our ground forces ever get there. Anything that emits a radio or radar signal, or looks like a heavy weapon or armored vehicle will be bombed. When we attack, our forces will descend on the area from several directions using armored vehicles and helicopters. They will surround the enemy, cutting off supplies and reinforcements. We will seize key intersections, bridges, tunnels and buildings very quickly. In most cases there will be very little fighting due to the initial bombardment and the speed of the attack. Another reason is that the Iraqis simply cannot defend very much of a large city like Baghdad. To defend only a couple of city blocks in strength takes hundreds of soldiers. Most of the city will not be defended at all. Obviously, soldier fighting for a particular building will find it a significant event, but it will not be Stalingrad.

In most cases, we will not fight room to room. We will attempt to enter a building. If we enter successfully, we will clear it; using the techniques you have seen the soldiers practicing on TV. If we cannot enter the building initially or encounter significant resistance once inside, we will pull back and blow the building apart. If necessary, we will repeat the process on the next building. [Note: this is the tactic that US troops learned to use in World War II. When the Germans defended a building, the US troops called tanks forward and just blew it down -- DS.]

At the end of the first phase of the attack the situation will most likely be that small numbers of Iraqis will be holed up in scattered locations. We will quickly overcome some of these positions. Others may put up more resistance. Depending on the situation, including the proximity of civilians, we will surround some of these locations and try to talk them out. In other cases, the ground commander will give the defenders an opportunity to surrender. If they refuse, airplanes and helicopters will drop laser-guided bombs into the building. Tanks and Bradleys will pour cannon and machine gun fire into it. The survivors will be invited to surrender again. If they refuse, there will be more fire and an infantry assault.

The infantry will most likely attack at night. Every one of our soldiers has some sort of night vision device. A large proportion of our weapons have “red dot” lasers on them. The red dot is a low power laser light that shows where the bullets will strike when the weapon is fired - a big advantage. The assault will begin with artillery, mortar, tank, machinegun and grenade launcher fire. This will shut down any attempt by the enemy to return fire. As the infantry advances, supporting fires will continue over their heads or be shifted to nearby enemy positions to prevent them from supporting the one under attack. The buildings will probably not be left standing. The infantry will move over the rubble throwing hand grenades and firing into anything that resembles a defensive position. They will enter and seize the next defensible position. The tanks and Bradley’s will move up to the new line.

This same scenario will play out on a larger scale if the Iraqis attempt to hold a large area or even if they fortify it. In this case they might control 10 or 20 city blocks. If that happens, the attack described above will be repeated several times on a larger scale, until the remainder of the defenders either quit or try to retreat.

The biggest problem will be civilians. We will do everything in our power to get civilians out of the combat area before we attack. The initial air attacks will be very accurately directed against identified targets and while there will be some civilian casualties, they will be largely the result of the Iraqis choosing to locate weapons and headquarter in the middle of non-combatants. If they do this, it is they who are violating the Laws of Land Warfare. But, even in past wars we have successfully used imaginative methods to get civilians out of danger. In WWII for instance, the U. S. Army had German politicians from conquered towns call their counterparts in the next town to persuade them to negotiate a surrender, bypassing the German Army Commander in the town, rather than allow a fight. We can expect similar tactics in the pending war.

We probably will have some sort of effort to communicate to civilians as we enter Baghdad and give them instructions on what to do to avoid the fighting. In those areas where we are able to gain control, we will most likely move civilians out of the area. Once we have identified any centers of resistance, we will also be trying to identify if there are any non-combatants in the area. If we can, we will get them out of there before any further fighting. In some instances, the presence of civilians may cause us to adopt different tactics than outlined above.

Even as the fighting continues, the U.S. will be attempting to restore essential services, make sure the population has food and water and restore the rule of law. We will establish temporary housing facilities and assist in the medical treatment of the injured. At some point, control of captured areas will pass from military units to military or provisional civilian governments organized by the U.S.

For more reading, go to the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute. There are also very good discussions of urban warfare by Joe Katzman and Steven Den Beste.

Guest writer Patrick Walsh is a retired US Army infantry officer. His an assistant vice president in the Technology Project Office of a large financial services company located in Pittsburgh, PA. During his career, he served as deputy chief of operations in Joint Task Force 6; was the S-3 and then executive officer of the desert phase of the US Army Ranger school for 36 months; commanded a rifle company in the 7th Infantry Division; and commanded an Initial Entry Training Company for one year. Mr. Walsh wrote two field manuals on small unit operations and taught tactics for two years. He also served as rifle platoon leader, anti-tank platoon leader and rifle company executive officer.

by Donald Sensing, 2/25/2003 10:41:01 AM. Permalink |